

SECURITY INFORMATION
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4 November 1952

THE PROBLEM

1. To examine the concept for U.S. psychological efforts vis-a-vis Europe and the U.S. organization and capabilities for implementing psychological programs in Europe. (This paper deals primarily but not exclusively with covert aspects)

2. Psychological Climate

There is general agreement among responsible officials in the government and in the minds of qualified observers of the European scene that the psychological climate today in Europe is at a critically low ebb. Some indices are:

a. The fact that Communist influence in Europe measured in terms of party membership, hard core affiliations and size of Communist organization has not materially decreased in the seven years of the cold war.

b. The growing neutralist sentiments, veering often to open anti-Americanism, added to the considerable pro-Communist sentiments, has resulted in apathy and indifference to measures designed to make Europe secure, economically prosperous and independent. For more detailed analysis of the current European morale situation, see Tab A.

Failure of constructive proposals for a more national organization of Europe's political and economic life to gain widespread acceptance.

[The EDC Treaties might even fail of ratification. The situation had reached such a stage that the United States Government could not overtly intervene in the matter, but that any covert support which could be given to the ratification would be most beneficial to the interests of the United States.]

3. It has become common to say that Europe is not the object of a tug-of-war rather than a protagonist in the current cold war struggle.

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Europe's psychological climate is nonetheless the result of an equation containing these elements--(a) Soviet Psychological pressure and actions on Europe, (b) U.S. psychological pressure and actions on Europe, and (c) the subjective state of mind of the Europeans themselves who are the objects of these conflicting pressures. It follows that U.S. measures in themselves are not alone responsible for the present situation there, nor can they, even if made more effective, be certain of altering the climate to one more favorable to ourselves. Nonetheless, one cannot regard U.S. psychological efforts toward Europe with any degree of complacency. They have been faulty in these respects:

a. Concept. The art of psychological operations is to create a state of mind and then act upon or take action which that state of mind will support after it has been created. Our overt policies toward Europe have fluctuated and have rarely been planned for any reasonable period in advance. No paper or papers exist which comprehensively define U.S. psychological objectives in Europe.

b. Implementation. Even when there has been given adequate policy for psychological operations in advance of a major [REDACTED] action, the means available to implement policy have either been inappropriate or too meager to achieve the results desired.

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if it is a symbol of adherence to a common ideal and ethic, if there is included within the NATO concept goals for common action which define the moral basis by which conflicting national self-interest can be resolved.

Official information support of NATO either channeled through NATIS or sponsored by the various nationalist governments, including our own, must hew to the official national position and must be responsive to political pressure groups operating within national frontiers. Because the American position is one of undisputed leadership in official NATO circles, the official American position almost invariably becomes the official NATO position and is frequently presented as such by the European governments to their citizens. Resistance and resentment of official NATO policies thus can be roused through European neutralism and anti-Americanism.

Even those Europeans most sympathetic to the NATO cause do not enjoy the sensation of having the major NATO policies dictated to them by the United States. On this point Raymond Aron remarked, "To accept passively the decisions of American policy is as deplorable as to pretend to isolate independence—which means, simply, impotence."

5. Strategy and Aims.

a. U.S. Strategy. U.S. Psychological strategy in Europe should disabuse European fears of U.S. attempts to use Europe as a pawn for essentially American interests. The guiding principle of European strategy should be to inspire European initiative to remove the prevailing belief that the U.S. will conduct its European policy uninfluenced by European attitudes and to stimulate European self-confidence.

b. Broad Statement of Psychological Aims Vis-a-vis Europe.
(These aims are stated in order in which they should be developed with regard to each European country.)

- (1) Eliminate Communist influence.
- (2) Reduce neutralist sentiments.

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- (3) Transmute nationalism from a single country basis to identification with membership of the large European community.
- (4) Unite WE with Atlantic world.
- (5) Demonstrate to non-Europeans that Atlantic Community is not a white man's club but rather the democratic bastion of a free world.

c. Governmental Actions or Policies Required to Make an Effective Psychological Effort Vis-a-vis Europe Possible.

- (1) Military: Emphasize French military build-up and soft-peddle demands for German rearmament until French forces are in better shape.
- (2) Actively campaign for supervised free elections as a prerequisite to unification of Germany.
- (3) Insure that significant American economic aid is channeled through multi-national agencies rather than directly with individual countries. Similarly, insure that military aid assistance is channeled through multi-national agencies rather than directly.
- (4) Propagate forcefully and frequently our intentions for the peaceful return of the satellites to Europe.

[The U.S. and Britain asylum policy toward defectors should be as widely disseminated as possible throughout the Western European press. If this is done, the information may seep through the Iron Curtain somewhere. While this dissemination would be of extreme use in inducing defection, it would also be of considerable aid in combatting neutralism in Western Europe, especially if more fresh propaganda material could be developed from orbit sources for dissemination in Western Europe. Defector stories could promote greater sympathy in the Western World for those living behind the Iron Curtain. In order to achieve this twin aim, there should be a greater exchange of propaganda analysis and propaganda lines between efforts in Germany and the rest of Western Europe.]

- (5) Initiate program to make overseas economic resources collectively available to Europe.
- (6) Encourage trade of non-strategic materials between Eastern and Western Europe with a view to diverting Satellite interest and trade from Russia to Western Europe. (Contact is essential if any governmental defection is ever to take place.)
- (7) Expedite official purchases under MSA program. Encourage U.S. firms benefiting from European trade to campaign for reduction of U.S. tariffs.

6. Type Psychological Activity in Perspective.

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Major Psychological Aims

- a. To Destroy Communism:
Communist parties
Communist fringe
Communist labor

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TAB ATHE PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE1. General Situation.

Western Europe today is the scene of a widespread and deep-rooted apathy towards the communist threat. This has manifested itself in a growing feeling of neutralism, i.e., an unwillingness to fight for those principles which, up until the present, have been the heritage of Western Europe. Two devastating wars, a prolonged occupation, and a determined, large-scale communist propaganda campaign have taken their toll.

The trend toward neutralism in Europe poses a serious threat to the adequate development of the community concept and to the success of our policy vis-a-vis the USSR. The neutralist sentiment is being subtly exploited by the communists. It is on this foundation that the ambitious communist front, Fighting Democracy, has been organized. This front advocates controlled disarmament with international inspection, freedom of information and communication between countries, a united Europe, and a united world. This front appeals to the continental mood and ignores the Soviet threat. The Europeans are anxious to avoid, if possible, rearmament burdens and would like to give the Soviets opportunities to demonstrate their peaceful intentions.

2. Communist Situation.

a. The major aim of the Soviet peace offensive which has been in progress some two years was to prevent the organization of the defense of Western Europe. Their first tactic was to advance "peace" per se by exploiting deep-seated emotions of pacifism vs. militarism and, in general, revolt against war. After intensive cultivation of the deep-seated longing for peace, they then utilized "peace" to encourage "neutralism" by developing the very simple proposition that neutrality leads to peace. After establishing neutrality as the basic prerequisite for peace, their next objective became evident; namely, that a neutral Europe cannot be

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identified with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. Therefore, if Europe is to be neutral it must break off entangling alliances with the U.S. In effect, the goal of European neutrality requires positive action to gain European independence from the U.S. Obviously, if the communist campaign should succeed, Europe would be at the open mercy of the Soviets.

b. At the present time the communists have thousands upon thousands of PW operatives in Europe, not only because they use a large amount of funds nor because they have recruited, trained, and employed such persons, but primarily because they have organized all individuals participating in communist front organizations, including youth, labor, peace, and women's groups into walking propaganda units for communism.

c. Sheer volume of propaganda output has played a considerable role in the success communists have achieved today in Western Europe. Within the past six months the effectiveness of the overt communist mechanisms in Europe has declined. Perhaps the communists anticipated this decline for they have increasingly relied upon the use of their undisclosed assets operating under the cloak of avowed European neutralists and nationalists.

3. The Non-Communist Situation in Europe.

a. Probably the dominant motivation among Europeans today is the desire to avoid war. Over a year ago Lord Ismay, now Chairman of the NATO Council, stated, "Our obvious, our supreme and only aim should be to avoid war." These strong words from Churchill's Chief of Staff in World War II reflect the deep and underlying anxiety of the Europeans. The neutralist position inspired by the pressure of this motivation has been described as "the rationalization of desertion." Neutralism is strong today in Europe because anxiety, insecurity and passivity prevail. Neutralism is potentially dangerous to our policies and advantageous to the Soviets.

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4. The Official Situation.

An analysis of existing U.S. organizations and NATIS as well shows the official efforts in the European area are not geared to meeting today's needs. All governmental propaganda in Europe today is highly suspect. The few unofficial organizations that exist in Europe for the avowed purpose of supporting the NATO aims have been inadequate and thus far ineffective. At the same time the official U.S. policy in favor of greater rearmament efforts which has been reluctantly supported by most European governments, has tended to have a negative morale effect on the continent. It has convincingly demonstrated to them their ever increasing military dependence on the U.S. and scarcely lessened economic dependence. Because of the European "drag" on rearmament the U.S. has sometimes considered direct action to take the place of actions which the European governments would not themselves sponsor. This has led to mutual resentment and mutual recrimination on both sides and has spawned neutralism in Europe as well as the "Europe be damned" attitude in the U.S. Georges Bidault recently made this comment on this issue, "It would be an error to minimize these misunderstandings. They exist, and we must deal with them. It must be pointed out, at the same time, that most frictions are caused not by the policies of the U.S. government, but by ill-conceived and loud opinions spread through the media of mass communications."

5. Situation Summary.

The major threat posed by this situation to the success of NATO is that the continental Europeans see the weaknesses and inadequacies of their present situation, but lack the will to alter it for the better. What is evidently lacking is the positive moral, economic and political content which the concept of the Atlantic Community must have if NATO is to survive.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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6 Nov 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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4. (for PPC retention)					The attached paper represents an endeavor to establish a conceptual pattern for psychological efforts vis-a-vis Europe. It may serve a useful purpose in delineating our covert responsibilities with regard to overall operations in this important area. <i>WRE</i>
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